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INTRODUCTION
Viewed in a certain light, tort law serves primarily to give injury
victims a means of imposing onerous burdens on their injurers.
Through the remedy of injunction, tort law enables victims to restrict
their injurers’ freedom of action, and through the remedies of
damages and restitution, tort law enables victims to deprive their
injurers of money and other things of value. Moreover, tort law
distinctively grants victims themselves the power to impose these
burdens, rather than reserving prosecutorial discretion to the state.
These features of tort law invite the charge that tort law is
essentially a form of institutionalized revenge. If sound, this charge
is damning. Most would agree that institutions of revenge have no
place in a just society, and even those who might see a place for such
institutions would likely find tort law to be a poor candidate. Because
tort liability is assessed by an objective standard, a standard that
generally pays no heed to a defendant’s individual capacities or to the
moral quality of a defendant’s motivation, tort law enables victims to
exact a remedy from injurers who are only slightly blameworthy or
even morally innocent—injurers no one would regard as appropriate
objects of revenge.1

Assistant Professor-Designate, University of Michigan Law School; Law Clerk,
Supreme Court of Connecticut; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Princeton University; A.B.,
Harvard University. I wish to thank the editors and the participants at The Florida State
University College of Law Symposium on Civil Recourse Theory.
1. As critics like Emily Sherwin see it, tort law receives little aid from philosophical
theories that strive to make sense of the institution’s basic structure. The theory of
corrective justice, for one, allegedly sweeps tort law’s relationship with vengeance under
the rug. See Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 139697 (2003) [hereinafter Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge]. Perhaps even more
problematic in Sherwin’s view is John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky’s theory of civil recourse,
which regards the retaliatory mechanism of a tort suit as tort law’s defining feature. See,
e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917
(2010); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the
Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998). Echoing a charge leveled against civil recourse
theory by John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 56-58 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002) (arguing against civil recourse theory, not against tort law), Sherwin suggests that,
far from rendering tort law normatively appealing, civil recourse theory brings tort law’s
uncomfortable relationship with vengeance into sharp focus. Emily Sherwin, Interpreting
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Behind this line of criticism lies a simple and perhaps arresting
argument. The revenge argument, as we might call it, relies on two
key premises: one about tort remedies, the other about tort plaintiffs.
Premise 1:
Premise 2:
Conclusion:

Tort remedies inflict harm on tortfeasors.
Plaintiffs are motivated to seek tort remedies by a
desire to inflict harm.
Tort law is a form of institutionalized revenge.2

The revenge argument seems to resonate with many people, so it is
an argument worth taking seriously. It nevertheless has two
troublesome characteristics: the premises are doubtful, and, even if
they are true, they provide no support for the conclusion.
I. DO TORT REMEDIES INFLICT HARM?
Tort remedies unquestionably impose burdens: they limit
defendants’ freedom of action and they cause defendants to part with
money and other things of value. These burdens are substantial. But
do they constitute harms? I submit that most of the time they do not.
First, consider the remedy of injunction. An injunction is a judicial
decree that the defendant shall engage in or refrain from a particular
course of conduct.3 Such a decree undeniably imposes limits on the
defendant’s freedom—actual limits as well as normative ones. The
decree imposes actual limits in that one who disobeys it may be fined
or imprisoned. The decree imposes normative limits in that it saddles
the defendant with a duty, something that by its very nature reduces
the range of the defendant’s permissible options.4 But besides
limiting the defendant’s freedom, an injunction communicates
something; in particular, it communicates something about the
defendant’s rights and duties. When a court enjoins me from entering
your land or damaging your property or misappropriating your trade
Tort Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 227, 232-33 (2011) [hereinafter Sherwin, Interpreting
Tort Law].
2. Sherwin in effect suggests that civil recourse theory entails the revenge argument
and therefore entails its unpalatable conclusion. Sherwin, Interpreting Tort Law, supra
note 1, at 232-33. I am not sure whether Sherwin means for this entailment to be a strike
against civil recourse theory (on the ground that the revenge argument’s conclusion is
false) or a strike against tort law itself (on the ground that the revenge argument is valid
and civil recourse theory is committed to the revenge argument’s premises). Nor am I sure
that civil recourse theory really entails either of the revenge argument’s premises. But I
am sure that even if civil recourse theory does entail the revenge argument’s premises
(that tort remedies inflict harm and that tort plaintiffs are motivated by a desire to inflict
harm), civil recourse theory does not thereby entail the argument’s conclusion (that tort
law is a form of institutionalized revenge). I am sure of this because I am sure that the
revenge argument is invalid. See infra Part III.
3 . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 48, note on terminology (1979)
(“[M]andatory injunctions order the defendant to take some affirmative action to undo a
wrongful action already in progress, while a prohibitory injunction orders the defendant to
refrain from doing some action that would violate the plaintiff’s rights.”).
4. The duty created by a mandatory injunction effectively reduces the defendant’s
permissible options to one. See supra note 3.
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secrets, the court thereby communicates (truthfully) that I have no
right to do these things. But if I have no right to do these things, then
a court that prevents my doing them arguably causes me no harm.
This idea is perfectly intuitive. It also draws support from a widely
accepted theoretical conception of harm, according to which harms
are (among other things) setbacks to legitimate interests.5 Although I
might have an economic interest in misappropriating your trade
secrets, this interest surely is not legitimate because I can satisfy the
interest only by violating your rights. Thus, an injunction that
frustrates my interest in misappropriating your trade secrets does
not truly cause me harm, at least according to what is perhaps the
most influential philosophical theory of harm.
Next consider restitutionary remedies—remedies that apply when
a defendant has taken another’s property or obtained a gain through
fraud or disloyalty. These remedies, too, probably inflict no harm. It
is quite a stretch to say that a court causes me harm when it orders
me to return property that I have stolen from you. This property is
not rightly mine; indeed, it is not really mine at all. It is yours, and I
have a duty to give it back—a duty that arises long before any court
gets involved. It is equally a stretch to say that a court causes me
harm when it orders me to disgorge profits that I have earned by
defrauding you or by breaching your trust. I have no right to such
profits, so their loss arguably causes me no harm. As before, these
ideas are backed by theory as well as intuition. If harms are (among
other things) setbacks to legitimate interests, then, because a
wrongful gain simply is not something in which I have a legitimate
interest, the court that disgorges my wrongful gain does not truly
cause me harm.
For similar reasons, a typical award of compensatory damages
probably does not inflict harm, either. Like an injunction or an order
of restitution, an award of compensatory damages imposes on the
injurer a legal duty—in this case a duty to compensate the injured
plaintiff. Typically, such a duty has substantially the same content as
a duty that the injurer has already, namely, an ordinary moral duty
of repair. The moral duty arises long before the legal duty does, as
injurers generally have a moral duty to repair the injuries they cause
or to pay compensation when these injuries are irreparable. So, when
a court orders an injurer to compensate her victim, the court orders
the injurer to do something substantially the same as what she
already has a duty to do anyway. But if the order merely compels the
injurer to do what it already and independently would have been
wrong for her not to do anyway, the order arguably causes her no
harm. Once again, this idea is backed by theory as well as intuition.
If I have a moral duty to part with a given sum of money, then any
5. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 34-38 (1984).
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interest I might have in retaining that money is not a legitimate one.
So, a setback to such an interest does not constitute a harm, at least
according to the widely accepted conception of harms as (among other
things) setbacks to legitimate interests.6
Now, some might resist my claim that a typical award of
compensatory damages merely compels an injurer to do what it
already and independently would have been wrong for her not to do
anyway. Many who might resist this claim would do so presumably
because they object to the idea that a defendant guilty only of minor
carelessness deserves to suffer a large financial loss.7 They are right
to object to this idea, of course, but they are wrong to think the idea
has anything to do with tort law. An award of compensatory damages
does not purport to inflict on the defendant a loss that she deserves.
To suppose that it does is to make the mistake of equating that which
a victim is morally entitled to demand from her injurer (by way of
compensation) with that which an injurer deserves to have happen to
her (by way of punishment). An injurer guilty only of minor
carelessness admittedly does not deserve much punishment. She
surely does not deserve to lose a large amount of money. But her
victim might nevertheless be entitled to demand a large amount of
money by way of compensation, especially if the victim is less at fault
for the injury than the injurer is.
The one remedy I have not yet mentioned is that of punitive
damages. Punitive damages serve explicitly to punish, so they
probably do inflict harm. But in this respect punitive damages seem
exceptional. Other tort remedies (such as compensatory damages)
might diminish a defendant’s welfare, but they do not thereby cause
her harm. To suppose that they do is to conceive harm as something
that occurs every time a person’s welfare decreases, and to conceive
harm in this way is to deprive the concept of its distinctive moral
significance. If every decrease in someone’s welfare were a harm,
harm would be so common that harming someone would not be prima
facie wrong, or else many seemingly innocent actions would be prima
facie wrong.

6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (arguing that,
because the size of an award of compensatory damages varies in proportion to the injury’s
severity rather than in proportion to the injurer’s culpability, awards of compensatory
damages sometimes impose burdens that injurers do not deserve to bear).
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II. ARE PLAINTIFFS MOTIVATED TO SEEK TORT REMEDIES
BY A DESIRE TO INFLICT HARM?
What motivates tort plaintiffs is an empirical question with
nothing like an obvious answer.8 Still, it seems unlikely that what
motivates tort plaintiffs is always or even usually a desire to inflict
harm. There is at most one tort remedy the very purpose of which is
to harm defendants: punitive damages. Injunctions are not meant to
harm defendants; they are meant to protect plaintiffs from future
injury.9 Awards of compensatory damages are not meant to harm
defendants either; they are meant to compensate plaintiffs for past
injury.10 That is presumably why almost everyone approves of
liability insurance. As long as an injured plaintiff receives
compensation, we generally do not care that his damages award
impoverishes the defendant’s insurance company instead of
impoverishing the defendant.
But even if you think that injunctions, orders of restitution, and
compensatory damages awards all do inflict harm, you should still
hesitate to infer that a plaintiff who seeks these remedies acts from a
desire to inflict harm. You should hesitate to infer this because the
inference is a fallacy. Here is an analogous fallacy: Whenever you
achieve one of your aims, you feel pleasure. It follows that pleasure
is always your ultimate aim. Psychological hedonism obviously
cannot be purchased so cheaply.11 Even if we feel pleasure whenever
we get what we want, it does not follow that our own pleasure is the
only thing we ever truly want. Pleasure might be a universal
consequence but it is not thereby a universal goal. Not all
consequences are goals. Not even all foreseeable consequences are
goals. So, even if tort remedies really do inflict harm, it does not
8. Compare Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, supra note 1, at 1403 (“The
[restitution] claimant desires not only to be reimbursed, but also to eliminate the
wrongdoer’s profits—a desire that is essentially vindictive. Viewed in this way,
compensatory remedies and restitutionary remedies can be seen as appealing to the same
aspect of human psychology: One set of remedies permits the claimant to better his
position at the wrongdoer’s expense; another permits the claimant to prevent the
wrongdoer from profiting at the claimant’s expense. Both enable claimants to
retaliate . . . .”), with Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 1765, 1813 (2009) (“[T]here is little if any evidence that the motive of most tort
plaintiffs is to make the defendant ‘suffer’ at all, and they certainly do not wish for the
defendant to suffer in the way that they have.”) (citing Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors
That Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries,
267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1359, 1359, 1361 (1992) (finding that fewer than one in five families
who filed medical malpractice claims based on perinatal injuries to their infants cited the
desire to “seek revenge or protect others from harm” as a motivation for filing suit)).
9. See supra note 3.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979) (“ ‘Compensatory damages’ are
the damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm
sustained by him.”).
11. See Joel Feinberg, Psychological Egoism, in REASON & RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS
IN SOME BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 501, 501-12 (Joel Feinberg ed., 3d ed. 1975)
(exposing flaws in various arguments for psychological egoism and psychological hedonism).
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follow that what motivates tort victims to seek these remedies is a
desire to inflict harm.
III. IS TORT LAW A FORM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED REVENGE?
You might think that I have been criticizing a straw person in
that I have made the premises of the revenge argument implausibly
strong. If you think this, you might also think that a more plausible
version of the revenge argument would go as follows:
Premise 1:
Premise 2:
Conclusion:

Tort remedies sometimes inflict harm on tortfeasors.
Plaintiffs sometimes are motivated to seek tort
remedies by a desire to inflict harm.
Tort law is a form of institutionalized revenge.

These weaker premises are indeed more plausible. (They might even
be true.) But the argument still has a problem. The problem is not
that if you weaken the revenge argument’s premises to make them
more plausible, the premises will no longer entail the conclusion. The
problem is rather that the conclusion does not follow even from the
original, stronger premises. Even if tort remedies always inflict harm
and plaintiffs always pursue these remedies out of nothing but a
desire to inflict harm, it does not follow that tort law is a form of
institutionalized revenge. The reason why this does not follow is
simply that an institution’s purpose does not depend on its
participants’ motivations.
To see why an institution’s purpose does not depend on its
participants’ motivations, consider a similar argument about the
income tax:
Premise 1:
Premise 2:
Conclusion:

The income tax inflicts harm on taxpayers.
Tax collectors are motivated to collect taxes by a
desire to inflict harm.
The income tax is a form of institutionalized harm
infliction.

As everyone knows, the income tax’s purpose is to raise revenue, not
to inflict harm. This remains the case no matter what the income
tax’s incidental effect and no matter what the tax collector’s
motivation. If the income tax does indeed inflict harm, it inflicts
harm only incidentally—even if it inflicts harm inevitably. So, even if
the tax collector is a sadist who enjoys taking people’s money, this
psychological fact cannot transform the income tax from an
institution of revenue into an institution of harm. The institution’s
purpose simply does not depend on its participants’ motivations.
The same is true for tort law. Like income taxes, tort remedies
(other than punitive damages) inflict harm only incidentally, if they
inflict any harm at all. Thus, even if the typical tort plaintiff wants
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nothing but to get even with his injurer, this psychological fact does
not render tort law an institution of revenge.

